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Antitrust Modernization Commission
Declares Antitrust Need Not be
Modernized, But Does Suggest a Few

Tweaks
By Thomas A. McCann
In 2002, the United States Congress created the Antitrust
Modernization Commission to wage a comprehensive review of U.S.
antitrust laws to determine whether they need to adapt to keep pace
with the changing business world.46 After conducting 18 hearings
over 13 days, hearing testimony from 120 witnesses and receiving
comments from 126 people and organizations, the commission
released its much awaited 540-page report in April 2007, concluding
on balance that U.S antitrust law is fundamentally sound and that no
significant changes are required.47
Despite recommending no wholesale changes to the current
antitrust enforcement system, the commission did make several
suggestions for improvement, and the courts are just beginning to
apply some of the commission's more progressive ideas to the
antitrust cases on their dockets.48
The U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary specifically
asked the Commission to analyze three main issues: (1) whether U.S.
antitrust law must be changed to address the role of intellectual
property; (2) whether enforcement priorities should change to reflect
the global economy; and (3) whether the state attorneys general
49
should play more of a role in antitrust enforcement.
The
50
questions.
three
commission responded "no" to all
Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §
11054(h), 116 Stat. 1856, 1857 (2002).
46

47 Charles Freed, The Antitrust Modernization Commission: "If It Ain't
Broke ....
."ANTITRUST, Summer 2007, at 7.

48 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, No. 05-35627, (9th Cir. Sept. 4,
2007).
49 Freed, supra note 47, at 7.
50 Id.

[Vol. 20:2

Loyola Consumer Law Review

240

The commission concluded there is no need to change the
antitrust laws to deal with "industries in which innovation'
51
intellectual property, and technological change are central features.
The commission recommended that in analyzing the competitive
effects of new economy industries, enforcers simply should give due
52
weight to market dynamics, just like any traditional antitrust case.
The commission further concluded that globalization should not
affect U.S. antitrust enforcement, but instead recommended that there
be greater cooperation among international antitrust authorities and
greater coordination of different nations' antitrust laws, including a
The
call for a centralized pre-merger notification system. 53
role
in
the
change
be
no
commission finally recommended that there
of the state attorneys general, but advised that they should stick to
coordination
local antitrust violations and there should be more
54
between the federal and state enforcement agencies.
Notwithstanding the report's "don't change a thing" tenor, the
commission did make one novel recommendation regarding
"bundling" violations under § 2 of the Sherman Act.55 That section
of the Sherman Act "forbids 'monopolization' and 'attempted
monopolization' (as well as combinations and conspiracies to
monopolize) of any part of the trade or commerce of the United
States. ,,56 In addition to traditional schemes to acquire monopoly
power, courts have recognized that companies can also utilize
"bundled discounts" to drive away competition, using schemes in
which they offer a discount or rebate to customers if they buy a
package of products in an effort to deter entry into the market, to use
it as predator pricing or as a form of illegal "tying," which violates
antitrust law. 7 However, the commission recognized that bundling is
exceedingly common in today's economy, from cell phone products

51 ANTITRUST

RECOMMENDATIONS,

MODERNIZATION

COMMISSION,

at 32 (2007) [hereinafter AMC

REPORT
REPORT],

http://www.amc.gov.
52

id.

53

AMC

54

Id. at 187.

55

Freed, supra note 47, at 7; See also 15 USC § 2.
AMC REPORT, supra note 51, at 84; See also 15 USC § 2.

56

57

REPORT,

supra note 51, at 232.

Freed, supra note 47, at 7.

AND

available at
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to car/home/life insurance packages, and it can significantly lower
costs for consumers.58
The commission report proposed an "objective, cost-based
approach" for determining the legality of companies offering
"bundled" discounts. 59 First, a court should take the entire discount
or rebate of the product bundle and deduct it just from the price of the
product on which the defendant competes with the plaintiff.60 If,
after that calculation, the price of the defendant's product is still
above its incremental cost of production, the defendant wins. 6 1 Even
if the plaintiff establishes that prices are below the defendant's
incremental cost of production, the defendant still wins unless the
plaintiff can prove that the defendant is able to recoup its losses from
the pricing scheme,
and that the scheme causes harm to
competition.
The Ninth Circuit recently applied this cost-based test to an
antitrust case involving the healthcare market. 63 The appellate court
chose to follow the commission's recommendation and to reject the
more ambiguous approach adopted by the Third Circuit, an approach
that did not consider whether the bundled discounts constituted
competition on the merits, but simply concluded that all bundled
discounts offered by a monopolist are anticompetitive with respect to
its competitors who do not manufacture an equally diverse product
line. 64 The Third Circuit standard would not require a cost-based
analysis and would allow the jury to find bundled discounts
exclusionary merely upon a showing that a competitor could not offer
the same bundle as the defendant.65
PeaceHealth and McKenzie are two hospital care providers in
Lane County, Oregon. PeaceHealth provides basic care and more
advanced "tertiary care" services while McKenzie provides only
basic care service. PeaceHealth has more than 90 percent of the

58

AMC

REPORT,

supra note 51, at 95.

51 Id. at 89, 99.
60 Id. at 99.
61Id., See also Freed, supra note 47, at 7.
62

Id.

63

See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007).

64 Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 910; See also LePage's Inc. v. 3M,
324 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2003).
65 id.
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county's market for advanced care and about 75% for basic care. 66
McKenzie alleged in its complaint that PeaceHealth offered insurers
35 to 40 percent discounts on advanced care if the insurers made
PeaceHealth their exclusive preferred provider.67 Further, McKenzie
alleged that it could offer basic care services at a lower cost than
PeaceHealth, but because of the bundled discounts, McKenzie was
driven out of the market for those services. 68 The district court
instructed the jury to apply the Third Circuit standard, and the jury
awarded69the plaintiff $5.4 million, which the court trebled to $16.2
million.
In vacating the district court's judgment, the Ninth Circuit
analyzed both tests and came out on the side of the Antitrust
Modernization Commission. The court said that while bundling can
be anticompetitive in certain situations, the majority of businesses,
both big and small, use bundles to instill customer loyalty, lower net
prices to consumers, increase demand in lieu of advertising,
encourage use of a new product, or enter a new market. The court
said that the Third Circuit prohibited some competitive business
behavior and that "we think the course safer for consumers and our
competitive economy to hold that bundled discounts may not be
considered exclusionary conduct... unless the discounts result in
prices 7that
are below an appropriate measure of the defendant's
1
costs."

The court then considered several tests to determine which
bundling schemes were bad and adopted the commission's "discount
attribution" standard.72 The court reasoned that this standard makes
the defendant's bundled discounts legal unless the discounts have the
potential to exclude a hypothetical equally efficient producer of the
competitive product, i.e. it that pretends that the actual plaintiff is
equally efficient to the defendant. The court provided this example
of how the test works:
66

CascadeHealth Solutions, 502 F.3d at 902.

67

Id. at 903.

68

Id. at 907.

69

Id. at 901, 904-5.

70

Id. at 906.

71CascadeHealth Solutions, 502 F.3d at 913.
72

Id. at 916.

73

Id. at 916-17.
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A [is] a firm that makes both shampoo and conditioner. A's
incremental cost of shampoo is $1.50 and A's incremental
cost of conditioner is $2.50. A prices shampoo at $3 and
conditioner at $5, if purchased separately. However, if
purchased as a bundle, A prices shampoo at $2.25 and
conditioner at $3. Purchased separately from A, the total
price of one unit of shampoo and one unit of conditioner is
$8. However, with the... discount, a customer can purchase
both products from A for $5.25, a discount of $2.75 off the
separate prices, but at a price that is still above A's variable
cost of producing the bundle. Applying the discount
attribution rule.. .we subtract the entire discount..., $2.75,
from the separate per unit price of the competitive product,
shampoo, $3. The resulting effective price of shampoo is
thus $0.25. If a customer must purchase conditioner from
A at the separate price of $5, a rival who produces only
shampoo must sell the shampoo for $0.25 to make
customers indifferent between A's bundle and the separate
purchase of conditioner from A and shampoo from the
hypothetical rival.74
The court said the pricing scheme has the effect of excluding
any potential rival who produces only shampoo, and does it at an
incremental cost above $0.25. 75 Thus, the bundling excludes
potential competitors that could produce shampoo more efficiently
(i.e., at an incremental cost of less than $1.50).76P
The court also approved of the scheme because it "provides
clear guidance for sellers that engage in bundled discounting
practices. A seller can easily ascertain its own prices and costs of
production and calculate whether
its discounting practices run afoul
77
of the rule we have outlined.,
Going back to the other facets of the Antitrust Modernization
Commission, the body advocated leaving well enough alone. The
commission rejected any wholesale changes to the current
enforcement system, which is quite harsh by international standards,

74

Id. at 917.

75id.
76
77

CascadeHealth Solutions, 502 F.3d at 917.
Id.at 918.
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with treble damages, and jail terms for major violations."
The
commission said "[o]n balance, the current scheme appears to be
effective in enabling plaintiffs to pursue litigation that enhances the
deterrence of unlawful behavior and compensates victims. ' 79 The
commission did recommend that Congress enact legislation that
would permit non-settling defendants to obtain a more equitable
reduction of the judgment against
them and allow for contribution
80
defendants.
non-settling
among
The commission was critical of the current merger review
process, advocating stricter rules and a tighter timeline for getting the
process done. 8' The commission also was critical of antitrust
8 2
exemptions and immunities granted by the federal government.
The report pounded home that Congress must stop granting special
industry exemptions and reevaluate existing exemptions to see if the
reasons for them, such as societal goals, still outweigh the harm to
competition. 83 The Commission also recommended that federal
antitrust agencies have full merger enforcement authority over
regulated industries and should exclusively conduct the analysis,
instead of having it84redone and second-guessed by the industry's
regulatory authority.
The Antitrust Modernization Commission's long-awaited
report was short on pizzazz but did provide a useful top-down review
of the antitrust regime in the United States. 85 Courts are already
applying the body's recommendations in the bundling arena, and its
other recommendations are likely to influence policy both in
Congress and the federal agencies involved in antitrust
enforcement. 86 It's still too early to tell, but many experts in the

78 AMC REPORT, supra note 51, at vi.
79 Id.
80

id.

8!Id. at

15.

81 Id. at 435.
83 AMC REPORT, supra note 51, at 334.
84

Id. at 342.

85 Freed, supra note 47, at 8.
86

id.
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antitrust
field say the report's $4 million price tag was still worth the
87
price.

87

Id.

